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WHEN IS A CODE A CODE? 
ANDREW HEMMING*
This paper will develop the proposition that criminal codes in Australia are 
misnamed because they fail the fundamental test for a code of 
comprehensively stating the criminal law in one statute. This contention 
applies to all codes from the Griffith Codes of Queensland, Western 
Australia, Tasmania and the Northern Territory to the more recently minted 
Criminal Code 1995 (Cth). The reason for such failure is that all the codes 
are too sparsely written, and, due to inadequate definitional detail or 
statement of the appropriate tests to be applied, judges are required to have 
recourse to the common law to ‘fill in the blanks’ left by the code. It is here 
argued that a code needs to be structured with the objective of keeping 
statutory interpretation within the four corners of the code. Bland 
injunctions that recourse to the common law is permissible only when the 
meaning is uncertain or where a prior technical meaning existed are wholly 
inadequate.  
 
The paper sets out  a series of examples which cover both offences and 
defences (such as causation and provocation) and which are intended to 
demonstrate the appropriate level of detail required to meet the 
conventional definition of a true code without sacrificing clarity. These 
examples should be viewed as templates for use in a variety of contexts, 
supporting the proposition that clarity, not confusion, can result from more 
detailed drafting. Drafting of this kind, which is directed at incorporating 
the relevant tests that the legislature accepts as appropriate, reduces 
reliance on secondary material such as second reading speeches. Secondly, 
it firmly tilts the legislature-judiciary ‘partnership’ in favour of the 
legislature (as a true code should) leaving the judiciary to explain the tests 
to the jury rather than to select which tests are appropriate. In this way at 
least consistency within a code, rather than uniformity across codes, can be 
promoted. 
I THE MEANING OF A CODE 
In a map of the law executed upon such a plan there are no terrae 
incognitae, no blank spaces: nothing is at least omitted, nothing unprovided 
for: the vast and hitherto shapeless expanse of jurisprudence is collected and 
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condensed into a compact sphere which the eye at the moment’s warning 
can traverse in all imaginable directions.1
This paper endorses the above quotation from the pen of Jeremy Bentham, of 
whom the then Federal Minister for Justice, in the Second Reading Speech 
introducing the legislation that became the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth), 
said: ‘codification of the criminal law has its roots in the work of the 18th 
century jurist Jeremy Bentham’.
 
2 In particular, this paper focuses on the 
words ‘no blank spaces’ which reflected Bentham’s dislike of judge-made law 
because it was unwritten, uncertain and retrospective.3 It is here contended 
that the Criminal Code 1899 (Qld), the Criminal Code 1902 (WA) the 
Criminal Code 1924 (Tas) and the Criminal Code 1983 (NT) (the Griffith 
Codes)4
Codification has been defined as ‘the setting out in one statute of all the law 
affecting a particular topic whether it is to be found in statutes or in common 
law’.
 fail Bentham’s test for a code (‘no terrae incognitae’) and that even 
Chapter 2 of the Criminal Code 1995 (Cth) does not pass muster. 
5 This aspirational view was certainly shared by Sir Samuel Griffith who 
‘envisaged that the Code should be a collected and explicit statement of the 
criminal law in a form that could be ascertained by an intelligent person’,6 
whilst pointing out to the Attorney-General in his famous Explanatory Letter 
that the criminal law of Queensland was scattered throughout nearly 250 
statutes outside of the applicable common law.7
                                                 
1 H L A Hart (ed), Jeremy Bentham, Of Laws in General (Athlone Press, 1970) 246. 
  
2 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 1 March 1995, 1,331 
(Duncan Kerr, Minister for Justice). 
3 Bentham likened the common law to the way a man makes law for his dog by breaking a habit 
through a beating immediately after the event, since ‘the dog only learns after the punishment 
that what it has done is wrong’. See Alan Norrie, Crime, Reason and History: A Critical 
Introduction to Criminal Law (Cambridge University Press, 2nd ed, 2001) 19. 
4 While the Northern Territory has imported Chapter 2 of the Criminal Code 1995 (Cth) as Part 
IIAA effective from 20 December 2006, this presently applies only to a very narrow range of 
offences against the person listed in Schedule 1. 
5 Mr Justice Ronan Keane, ‘Thirty Years of Law Reform 1975 – 2005’, (Speech delivered at 
the 30th Anniversary of the Law Reform Commission of Ireland, Farmleigh House, Phoenix 
Park, Dublin, 23 June 2005, 9. 
6 Simon Bronitt and Bernadette McSherry, Principles of Criminal Law (LBC, 2005) 72, citing 
Sir Samuel Griffith, ‘Explanatory Letter to the Attorney-General Queensland with Draft 
Code’ in K Whitney, M Flynn and P Moyle, The Criminal Codes (2000) 5.  
7 Sir Samuel Griffith, Explanatory Letter to Draft of a Code of Criminal Law (1897) iv. 
Another former Chief Justice of the High Court has stated that Griffith ‘intended his Code to 
be an exhaustive statement of the law, and not merely a consolidation of part of it [but] the 
decisions that would interpret the Code would mean that the Code was not an exclusive 
source of law’: Sir Harry Gibbs, ‘The Queensland Criminal Code: From Italy to Zanzibar’ 
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The arguments for and against codification have been usefully collected by 
Farmer.8 The objections to codification are: (1) that ‘the common law is 
uncodifiable’; (2) that such a code would ‘sacrifice the flexibility of the 
common law, trapping its reasoning within rigid conceptual confines’; (3) that 
judge-made law is better or less out of touch than law made by the legislator; 
and (4) that the common law’s greatest strength is its adaptability. This 
hostility to a code has been described as ‘codiphobia’,9 defined as a morbid 
fear and steadfast resistance to the ideas of codification emanating from the 
European continent.10
Mr Justice John Hedigan of the High Court of Ireland has addressed Farmer’s 
four objections in favouring codification.
 
11 The first objection to codification 
— that the common law is uncodifiable — would seem, according to 
Hedigan, to be countered by the experience of common law jurisdictions, such 
as Canada,12 the United States,13 New Zealand14 and Australia, that have 
adopted criminal codes.15
                                                                                                                    
(Speech delivered at the Opening of Exhibition at Queensland Supreme Court Library, 
Brisbane, 19 July 2002, 11. 
 As regards Australia, it is significant in the context 
8 Lindsay Farmer, ‘Reconstructing the English Codification Debate: The Criminal Law 
Commissioners, 1833-45’ (2000) 18(2) Law and History Review 397, 398. Farmer here 
summarises the debate over the pros and cons of codification as follows: ‘The code, in short, 
offers system, the common law adaptability – whatever the supposed merits of each.’  
9 Farmer, ibid, states that ‘the term was coined by Andrew Amos, Professor of Law at 
University College, London, and a former law commissioner, to describe the failure of the 
English legislator to grasp the nettle of codification’, citing Andrew Amos, Ruins of Time, 
exemplified in Sir Matthew Hale’s Pleas of the Crown (Stevens and Norton, 1859), xvii. 
10 Peter Goodrich, Reading the Law: A Critical Introduction to Legal Method and Technique 
(Basil Blackwell, 1986) 24. Farmer argues that because codification was scarcely thought to 
merit study by those imbued with English common law principles, the conceptual tools to 
understand ‘codification and legislation as part of the common law tradition, are simply not 
available’: above n 8.  
11 Mr Justice John Hedigan, ‘Codification of the Criminal Law and the European Convention 
on Human Rights’ (2008) <http://www.isrcl.org/Papers/2008/Hedigan.pdf> 8–10, paper 
submitted at the 22nd International Conference of the International Society for the Reform of 
Criminal Law held in Dublin, Ireland from 11 July – 15 July, 2008. 
12 Criminal Code of Canada (1892). Canada has the reverse constitutional situation to Australia 
as regards the criminal law. ‘The constitutional arrangement in Australia is that the general 
criminal law is a matter for the States and Territories and not for the Commonwealth’: 
Matthew Goode, ‘Constructing Criminal Law Reform and the Model Criminal Code’ (2002) 
26 Criminal Law Journal 152, 152. 
13 See, for example, the American Law Institute’s Model Penal Code promulgated in 1962 and 
which has influenced the fifty-two criminal codes in the United States. 
14 A Criminal Code Act was first introduced in New Zealand in 1893 and the current Crimes 
Act 1961 is a later enactment. 
15 Hedigan, above n 11, 8.  
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of the common law’s ‘steadfast resistance’16 to continental codes that Sir 
Samuel Griffith derived ‘very great assistance’17 from Zanardelli’s Italian 
penal code of 1888.18 O’Regan has pointed out that the Griffith provisions are 
‘in materially the same terms’ in Papua New Guinea.19
The second objection — that codification sacrifices the flexibility of the 
common law — overlooks, according to Hedigan, the need in any code for a 
degree of judicial interpretation in applying the code to situations that were 
not foreseen by the drafters of the code.
 
20 Goode has suggested that a ‘Code 
should provide better guidance for judges confronting a new situation’.21 
Supreme and District Court Benchbooks22
The third objection — that judge-made law is superior to that of the legislator 
— rather depends on the uniform quality of judges and on how adequately the 
legislation has been scrutinised. In addition, ‘beauty [in things] exists merely 
in the mind which contemplates them’.
 already assist judges in delivering 
model directions to juries in standard cases (the directions often being based 
on appellate court decisions) and these Benchbooks could be expanded to 
cover almost every conceivable scenario.  
23 In this context, Goode has 
memorably described Thomas J’s attack on the general principles outlined in 
the Model Criminal Code as ‘mere unreasoned abuse’.24
                                                 
16 See above n 8.  
 In any event, the 
Criminal Code (Cth) and Part 2 in particular, could scarcely have gone 
through greater public scrutiny, starting with the Gibbs Committee, then the 
17 Griffith, above n 7, vii.  
18 See Justice K A Cullinane, ‘The Zanardelli Code and Codification in the Countries of the 
Common Law’ (2000) 7 James Cook University Law Review 116. 
19 Robin O’Regan, New Essays on Australian Criminal Codes (LBC, 1988) 2. 
20 Hedigan, above n 11, 8. 
21 Matthew Goode, ‘Codification of the Australian Criminal Law’ (1992) 16 Criminal Law 
Journal 5, 13. 
22 See, eg, Department of Justice and Attorney-General, Supreme and District Court Benchbook 
(Queensland: The Department of Justice and Attorney-General, 2008). 
23 David Hume, Essays, Moral and Political (Kincaid, 1741) Essay 23. See also Hedigan, 
above n 11, 9. 
24 See above n 12, 159. 
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long drawn out MCCOC process25 and finally the emergence of the legislation 
itself, eclipsing any standard Law Reform Commission reference.26
The fourth objection addressed by Hedigan — regarding the superior 
adaptability of the common law as compared with a code — could equally be 
applied to the benefit of code interpretation, given judicial experience in 
adapting the common law to the circumstances of the case.
 
27 Goode has 
pointed out that ‘codification does not mean that every case must be 
specifically dealt with. The interpretative role of the judiciary will remain a 
vital element in the process.’28 Farmer argues that the negative perception of 
codification as an interloper in the legal systemhas resulted in ‘the existence 
of a long native tradition of codification [being] lost to view’.29
The arguments in favour of codification are, in Hedigan’s view, (1) that ‘a 
code enjoys democratic legitimacy’;
 
30 (2) the law of the legislator is better 
than judge-made law as it provides ‘a theory of adjudication binding judges to 
the code’;31 (3) ‘codification offers accessibility where the common law is 
only accessible to those trained in the artificial reasoning of the law’;32
                                                 
25 In 1991 the Standing Committee of Attorneys-General established the Model Criminal Code 
Officers’ Committee (MCCOC) ‘to prepare a uniform criminal code for all Australian 
jurisdictions … [and the] MCCOC has since gone on to produce a further seven reports on 
various areas of Commonwealth criminal law’: Stephen Odgers, Principles of Federal 
Criminal Law (LBC, 2007) 22 [0.0.140]. 
 and (4) 
that the code ‘offers system in the sense that it is both a restraint and a guide 
26 A typical government reference to a Law Reform Commission covers a single issue and is 
reported on within 18 months. 
27 See Hedigan, above n 11, 9. 
28 Goode, above n 21, 12.  
29 See above n 8, citing Barbara Shapiro, ‘Codification of the Laws in Seventeenth-Century 
England’ [1974] Wisconsin Law Review 428, 428–31. 
30 Hedigan, above n 11, 9. The Law Commission of England and Wales observed that ‘since the 
criminal law is arguably the most direct expression of the relationship between a State and its 
citizens, it is right as a matter of constitutional principle that the relationship should be clearly 
stated in a criminal code the terms of which have been deliberated upon by a democratically 
elected legislature’: Law Commission of England and Wales, A Criminal Code for England 
and Wales Vol 2, Report No 177 (1989) [2.2]. Underlying codification is the democratic 
concept of res nullius that the law belongs to no one in particular. Expert Group on the 
Codification of the Criminal Law, Codifying the Criminal Law, Department of Justice, 
Dublin, Ireland (2004) [1.28]. 
31 Hedigan, above n 11, 9 quoting the Expert Group on the Codification of the Criminal Law, 
‘Codifying the Criminal Law’, Department of Justice, Dublin, Ireland (2004) [1.27]. The 
architect of the American Law Institute’s Model Penal Code has argued that a code underlines 
the point that ‘when so much is at stake for the community and the individual, care has to be 
taken to make law as rational and as just as law can be’: Herbert Wechsler, ‘The Challenge of 
a Model Penal Code’ (1986) Criminal Law Review 285, 289-90. See Hedigan at 10.  
32 Hedigan, above n 11, 9 
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to judges’.33
readability, accessibility, simplicity and clarity … if the code is effectively 
to articulate and announce the criminal law’s rules of conduct.
 In sum, one academic commentator has concluded that the 
‘central virtues’ of codification are  
34
Taking up the last two virtues identified above – of simplicity and clarity – 
can it be fairly said that a code which contains far greater detail still retains 
clarity and avoids becoming submerged in a mire of statutory interpretation? 
Firstly, comparisons between common law jurisdictions and code jurisdictions 
in Australia are muddied because lawyers in both jurisdictions commonly 
refer to ‘multiple pieces of legislation’.
 
35 Statutory interpretation is becoming 
ever more important36 and is complicated by the ‘piecemeal nature’ of 
criminal legislation. A comprehensive ‘catalogue of offences’ and defences 
goes some way to aiding both the transparency and understanding of the 
criminal law.37
Secondly, it is recognised that the limitations and ambiguity of language will 
constrain the goal of keeping interpretation of the code’s terms within the four 
corners of a code. Also, the changing nature of social values, the creativity of 
advocates and the ingenuity of criminals all ensure that a code cannot be a 
closed system. Nevertheless, if a code starts from the proposition of ‘covering 
the field’ with the intention of distilling the relevant law through the specific 
selection or rejection of available legal options and tests, the room for 
manoeuvre within the code is reduced. Then all the well known rules of 
statutory interpretation, such as the rule that a provision be read in context
 
38 
or that a construction that promotes the purpose39
                                                 
33 Ibid, citing Expert Group, above n 31, [1.27]. 
 underlying the code shall be 
preferred, come to the fore. This paper is not a search for a perfect and 
34 Paul Robinson, Structure and Function in Criminal Law (Oxford University Press, 1997) 183 
as quoted by Hedigan, ibid 10. 
35 See Griffith, above n 7. See also n 21, 10, where Goode gives a list of common law offences 
in force in South Australia in the general area of offences of a public nature: ‘This, mind you, 
is just a list of the offences – discovering their content and coverage is yet another step.’ 
36 For example, in Campbell v R [2008] NSWCCA 214 (16 September 2008) the appeal turned 
on the meaning of the word ‘imports’, and in R v Toe [2010] SASC 39 the appeal rested on 
the physical element of ‘importing’. Campbell was construed in the context of s 307.11 and 
Toe under s 307.2 of the Criminal Code 1995 (Cth). 
37 For the quotations in this paragraph see Hedigan, above n 11, 10 and his quotation from Mr 
Justice Peter Charleton, ‘Homicide: Murder and Manslaughter’, Conference Paper at the Law 
Reform Commission Launch of their Report on Homicide, Dublin, 29 January 2008, 5–6. 
38 K & S Lake City Freighters Pty Ltd v Gordon and Gotch Ltd (1985) 157 CLR 309, 315 
(Mason J). 
39 See, eg, Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) s 15AA. 
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complete code, but an attempt to demonstrate that codes can be far truer to 
their intended design than is commonly thought. 
So how has the concept of codification translated into the Australian context? 
Gani has differentiated between (a) codification as per the Griffith Codes or 
the Model Criminal Code, which the learned author defines as a ‘complete 
statement of the law40 on the particular issue with which it deals’,41 and (b) 
codification of an ‘area of law within the context of a larger statute’,42 for 
instance by‘covering the field on a discrete subject’43
This paper takes issue with any criminal code in Australia being described as 
approaching a complete statement of the criminal law, and Gani herself points 
out that the Model Criminal Code Officers Committee (MCCOC) failed to 
spell out their concept of codification in any of their reports. Gani observes 
that the MCCOC’s ‘treatment of the codification chapter of the M[odel] 
C[riminal] C[ode] [Chapter 1] is extraordinarily brief (effectively, one page) 
and does not directly engage with conceptual issues or comparative 
perspectives’.
 as exemplified by the 
law of self-defence within the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW).  
44
Instead, the MCCOC was content to tacitly endorse, via supporting footnotes, 
the views of two writers: MCCOC member Matthew Goode
 
45 and English 
academic Andrew Ashworth.46
[A Criminal Code is a] pre-emptive, systematic, and comprehensive 
enactment of the whole field of law. It is pre-emptive in that it displaces all 
other law and its subject areas save only that which the Code excepts. It is 
 Goode’s definition of a criminal code is 
enlightening and provides a useful test against which to measure the success 
of any criminal code. 
                                                 
40 Citing here Dennis Pearce and Robert Geddes, Statutory Interpretation in Australia 
(Butterworths, 5th ed, 2001) [8.7] and [1.20]. 
41 Miriam Gani, ‘Codifying the Criminal Law: Implications for Interpretation’ (2005) 29 
Criminal Law Journal 264, 267. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Ibid 268. The precursor to the MCCOC, the Gibbs Committee, adopted a conservative 
approach to criminal law reform: ‘It should be noted that codification does not necessarily 
involve radical reform; the Review Committee would not propose to depart widely from 
existing principles, but would rather propose generally to restate existing principles whilst at 
the same time to fill gaps, remove obscurities and correct anomalies’: Review of 
Commonwealth Criminal Law, Interim Report: Principles of Criminal Responsibility and 
Other Matters (AGPS, 1990) 14 (Emphasis added). 
45 Goode, above n 21.  
46 Andrew Ashworth, ‘Interpreting Criminal Statutes: A Crisis of Legality?’ (1991) 107 Law 
Quarterly Review 419. 
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systematic in that all of its parts, arranged in an orderly fashion and stated 
with a consistent terminology, form an interlocking, integrated body, 
revealing its own plan and containing its own methodology. It is 
comprehensive in that it is sufficiently inclusive and independent to enable 
it to be administered in accordance with its own basic policies.47
By ‘comprehensive’ Goode ‘does not mean that a Criminal Code can or 




Goode’s justification of codification of the criminal law in Australia is 
grounded on ‘four very basic principles of social justice’
 Goode’s concern is to point out that a line has to be 
drawn somewhere, which he sees as a policy decision, and his discussion 
centres on whether juvenile offences, proceeds of crime legislation or 
pollution offences et al should be part of a criminal code. This paper 
respectfully agrees that such a pragmatic, broad-brush policy delineation is 
necessary. However, the real issue is the nature of the concept 
‘comprehensive’ in relation to all major indictable offences and of course the 
available defences. 
49
an authoritative statement of the major offences [which under a code] would 
be more accessible and more comprehensible, and there would be greater 
consistency in terminology and greater certainty in the scope of offences.
 which he identifies 
as easy to find, easy to understand, cheap to buy, and democratically made 
and amended. This echoes Ashworth’s expectation of a criminal code that it 
be  
50
As Gani has noted, the language used by Goode and Ashworth above ‘is 
highly reminiscent of that used by Sir Samuel Griffith’
  
51 in his 1897 
explanatory letter to the then Attorney-General of Queensland,52 which leads 
Gani to conclude that ‘the principles underlying the Model Criminal Code are 
very similar to those underlying the Griffith Codes of the 19th century’.53
                                                 
47 Above n 21, 9, citing W D Hawkland, ‘Uniform Commercial Code Methodology’ [1962] 
University of Illinois Law Forum 291-2 quoted in Letourneau and Cohen, ‘Codification and 
Law Reform: Some Lessons from the Canadian Experience’ (1989) 10 Statute Law Review 
183, 183. 
 But 
the codification of principles of social justice are a far cry from the 
codification of general principles of criminal law. The Model Criminal Code 
48 Goode, above n 21, 9.   
49 Ibid 8. 
50 Ashworth, above n 46, 420. 
51 Gani, above n 41, 269. 
52 Above n 7. 
53 Above n 41, 269. 
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is a clear improvement on the Griffith Codes which are caught in a 19th 
century time warp, perhaps requiring Doctor Who and the TARDIS (Time 
And Relative Dimension(s) In Space) to transport Sir Samuel Griffith into the 
21st century if there is to be any prospect of Queensland accepting the Model 
Criminal Code. 
II INTERPRETATION OF CRIMINAL CODES 
The enactment and operation of Criminal Codes in Australia for over a 
century has inevitably required the High Court to consider on numerous 
occasions the appropriate principles to be applied to code interpretation. 
Pearce and Geddes have suggested that the main issue that has required the 
attention of the courts is the extent to which regard may be had to the 
common law or previous statutes in interpreting a criminal code.54 Kirby J has 
addressed this issue in several judgments55
Although a code is enacted by legislation and thus attracts the general rules 
applicable to the task of statutory construction, it is a special type of 
legislation. It does not (unless expressly stated) set out to be a mere 
restatement of the pre-existing or common law. [Boughey v The Queen 
(1986) 161 CLR 10, 30 (Brennan J)]. It is not uncommon for codes, 
including in the area of criminal law, to introduce fundamental changes. [R 
v Martyr [1962] Qd R 398, 413 (Philp J)] Accordingly, it is erroneous to 
approach the meaning of a code with the presumption that Parliament's 
purpose was to do no more than restate the pre-existing law. [Brennan v The 
King (1936) 55 CLR 253, 263 (Dixon and Evatt JJ).] The first loyalty, as it 
has been often put, is to the code. [R v Jervis [1993] 1 Qd R 643, 647 
(McPherson ACJ); R v Barlow (1997) 188 CLR 1, 32 (Kirby J)] Where 
there is ambiguity, and especially in matters of basic principle, the 
construction which achieves consistency in the interpretation of like 
language in similar codes of other Australian jurisdictions will ordinarily be 
favoured. [Zecevic v Director of Public Prosecutions (Vict) (1987) 162 CLR 
645, 665 (Wilson, Dawson and Toohey JJ).] But before deciding that there 
is ambiguity, the code in question must be read as a whole. [cf R v Jervis 
[1993] 1 Qd R 643, 652 (McPherson ACJ)]. The operation of a contested 
provision of a code, or any other legislation, cannot be elucidated by 
confining attention to that provision. It must be presumed that the objective 
of the legislature was to give an integrated operation to all of the provisions 
of the code taken as a whole, and an effective operation to provisions of 
 but the most succinct version is to 
be found in Charlie v R. 
                                                 
54 Pearce and Geddes, above n 40, [8.8]. 
55 See, eg, R v Barlow (1997) 188 CLR 1 and Murray v The Queen (2002) 211 CLR 193. 
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apparently general application, except to the extent that they are expressly 
confined or necessarily excluded.56
The above passage is helpful as far as it goes. References to the fact that first 
loyalty should be to the code and thatthe code should be read as a whole are 
familiar tenets of statutory construction and could equally well be applied to 
the Australian Constitution, which is the very epicentre of Australian law. The 
Australian Constitution is a very sparsely written document and the High 
Court has wrestled with its interpretation since Federation. This paper 
contends that Criminal Codes in Australia suffer from the same defect, are too 
sparsely written and perforce require the judiciary to develop the law around 
the substantive sections.  
 
This in turn raises two related questions, one of which goes to policy and the 
other to technical meaning. Firstly, to what extent is the use of such sparse 
language a deliberate policy decision by the legislature to engage in ‘power-
sharing’ with the judiciary, notwithstanding the fact that a code is supposed to 
be a comprehensive enactment? Secondly, to what extent is the general part of 
the code – encompassing the principles of criminal responsibility – either 
irrelevant or inadequate for the purpose of construing the application of 
substantive offences? 
Given that one of the reasons for having a code is to confine judicial 
lawmaking, it is, as Gani suggests, ‘ironic that the development of the rules 
governing the interpretation of criminal and other codes in Australia has fallen 
and continues to fall largely within the province of the judiciary’.57 So can 
any clear guidance be had from Chapter 1 of the Criminal Code (Cth) 
regarding the construction of the Code? Leader-Elliott drily observes that 
‘Chapter 1 of the Code is stark in its brevity, a solitary provision declaring 
that the only offences against laws of the Commonwealth are those created by 
Commonwealth statute’,58 while Gani notes that the ‘MCCOC shied away 
from the issue’.59
There may have been good reason for adopting such a small-target approach, 
given the hostile reception of the original interpretation section of the Draft 
Criminal Code put forward by the Law Commission of England and Wales.
 
60
                                                 
56 [1999] 199 CLR 387, 394 [14] (footnotes in quoted material summarised in insertions). 
 
57 Gani, above n 41, 273. 
58 Ian Leader-Elliott, ‘Elements of Liability in the Commonwealth Criminal Code’ (2002) 26 
Criminal Law Journal 28, 31. 
59 Gani, above n 41, 273. 
60 Law Commission of England and Wales, A Criminal Code for England and Wales Vol 1, 
Report No 177 (1989) [3.14]–[3.15]. 
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Essentially, the argument against the inclusion of a construction clause was 
that ‘it was felt that provisions on interpretation were unnecessary insofar as 
they restate general principles of construction’61 or, in the alternative, ‘it was 
unwise to attempt to draft a comprehensive set of provisions [because] they 
would unbalance the Code and produce their own difficulties of 
interpretation’.62 One wonders if this attack was from a ‘fifth column’63
In any event, for present purposes, it is illuminating to juxtapose Leader-
Elliott’s comment that Chapter 2 of the Criminal Code (Cth) ‘is based on 
article 2 of the American Penal Code and the equivalent general part of the 
UK Draft Criminal Code’
 of 
common law diehards seeking to minimise the reach of code provisions.  
64 with Gani’s observation that the drafting team of 
the Draft Criminal Code accepted arguments that the provision [on 
interpretation] was ‘unnecessary [and] potentially dangerous’65 because it 
‘directs attention to the previous law and seems to invite a search for 
ambiguity’66 [such that] the construction and illustration provisions were 
omitted from the Draft Code Bill.67
All that can be gleaned from the singular failure of the MCCOC to address the 
important issue of construction is that ‘it appears that the principles 
enunciated by the High Court, and particularly Kirby J, will apply to the 
interpretation of Criminal Codes in Australia’.
  
68
This paper therefore answers the first question above by concluding that the 
paucity of language in Chapter 1 of the Criminal Code (Cth) demonstrates a 
clear policy decision by the legislature to engage in ‘power-sharing’ with the 
judiciary, with the MCCOC content to leave windows into the Code through 
which the common law freely passes. As will be demonstrated in later 
sections, the common law is implicitly incorporated into all the Criminal 
Codes of Australia both by reference and by design. 
 
Turning now to the second question above, one must ask: how successful is a 
general part in construing the application of substantive offences? A useful 
                                                 
61 Ibid [3.15]. 
62 Ibid. 
63 A fifth column is a group of people who clandestinely undermine a larger group from within 
to benefit an external enemy.  
64 Ian Leader-Elliott, ‘Benthamite Reflections on Codification of the General Principles of 
Criminal Law: Towards the Panopticon’ (2006) 9(2) Buffalo Criminal Law Review 391, 391. 
65 Law Commission, above n 60, [3.21]. 
66 Ibid. 
67 Gani, above n 41, 274 citing Law Commission of England and Wales, above n 60, [3.24]. 
68 Gani, above n 41, 275.  
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starting point can be found in Dixon CJ’s well known criticism of section 
13(1) of the Criminal Code (Tas) in Vallance v R.69 Leader-Elliott has 
suggested that Dixon CJ’s analysis of the Tasmanian incarnation of section 23 
of the Griffith Queensland Code and his Honour’s attack on section 13(1), the 
central provision of criminal responsibility in the Criminal Code (Tas), ‘was 
to have a devastating effect on attempts to articulate a coherent theory of 
criminal liability in jurisdictions which adopted the Griffith Code’.70
Vallance was charged with unlawful wounding. The question the High Court 
had to determine was the relationship between the offence of unlawful 
wounding and section 13(1) Criminal Code (Tas) which was derived from 
section 23 Criminal Code (Qld) and expressed in the following terms.  
 
No person shall be criminally responsible for an act unless it is voluntary 
and intentional; nor … for an event which occurs by chance. 
Dixon CJ fired his first salvo at Sir Samuel Griffith by declaring that  
an examination of the Code, in an attempt to answer what might have been 
supposed one of the simplest problems of the criminal law [the place of 
intention on a charge of unlawful wounding], leaves no doubt that little help 
can be found in any natural process of legal reasoning.71
Dixon CJ continued in similar vein by deriding the introductory part of the 
Code for containing ‘wide abstract statements of principle about criminal 
responsibility framed rather to satisfy the analytical conscience of an 
Austinian jurist than to tell a judge at a criminal trial what he ought to do’.
  
72 
By this Dixon CJ meant that such abstractions of doctrine were not to be 
interpreted as general deductions from specific instances that followed but 
came ‘ab extra and speak upon the footing that they will restrain the operation 
of what follows’.73
The problem, as Dixon CJ explained, was that the plan of the Tasmanian 
Code was to provide for specific offences whilst at the same time treating 
their complete definition as finally determined by Chapter IV (criminal 
responsibility). Such a complete definition could not be uniformly undertaken 
because  
 
                                                 
69 (1961) 108 CLR 56. 
70 Leader-Elliott, above n 58, 29. 
71 Vallance v The Queen (1961) 108 CLR 56, 58. 
72 Vallance v The Queen (1961) 108 CLR 56, 58. 
73 Vallance v The Queen (1961) 108 CLR 56, 58. 
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common sense rather suggests that guilt will depend on definitions that in 
point of fact will fall outside the philosophy of s 13 [and] to turn over the 
sections of the Code is enough to show how large a number of crimes there 
are to the elements of which s 13(1) can have little or nothing to say.74
Dixon CJ then applied s 13(1) — which he took to be saying that all the acts 
of the defendant that formed the elements of the offence had to be voluntary 
and intentional — to the offence of unlawful wounding and concluded that the 
wounding must be voluntary and intentional (not reckless). 
  
This then led to Dixon CJ’s second salvo at the architect of the Criminal Code 
(Qld), namely,  
that it is only by specific solutions of particular difficulties raised by the 
precise facts of given cases that the operation of such provisions as s 13 can 
be worked out judicially.75
Such a trenchant statement can be likened to an Exocet missile directed at the 
very heart of a code’s objective to be a complete statement of the law (‘no 
blank spaces’) and to minimise the need for judge-made law. 
  
Leader-Elliott has suggested that Dixon CJ’s argument was essentially that ‘s 
13(1) was an unnecessary irrelevance’.76 This seems a little broad, but 
certainly accurate for the type of offences that Dixon CJ identified, such as 
fraud, personation, sexual offences, receiving et al. More telling is Leader-
Elliott’s observation that Dixon CJ’s judgment went to the central defect of 
the Griffith Codes, namely, ‘their near complete failure to anticipate the 
effects which the general provisions of the Code were supposed to have on the 
analysis and application of the substantive offences’.77
                                                 
74 Vallance v The Queen (1961) 108 CLR 56, 60. 
 Thus, the plan upon 
which the Code was conceived fell apart because the central criminal 
75 Vallance v The Queen (1961) 108 CLR 56, 61. Two good examples of provisions being 
worked out judicially can be seen in the interaction between s 31 of the Criminal Code (NT) 
and, firstly, the now repealed s 162(1)(a) of the same Act which dealt with murder, and, 
secondly, the now amended s 192 of the same Act which covers sexual assault. In the first 
example, in Charlie v The Queen ([1999] 199 CLR 387, 410 [69]) Callinan J held that the 
express reference to intent in s 162(1)(a) meant that s 31 of the Criminal Code (NT) had no 
role to play as all the mental elements were set out in s 162(1)(a). In the second example, in 
Director of Public Prosecutions (NT) v WJI [2004] 219 CLR 43, 48–49 [8], Gleeson CJ held 
that in relating ss 192(3) and 31(1) of the Criminal Code (NT), having regard to the definition 
of ‘act’ (‘deed ... not limited to bodily movement’), a broad interpretation of ‘act’ necessarily 
followed such that the relevant act is having sexual intercourse with another person without 
the consent of the other person, as opposed to the DPP’s contention that the ‘act’ was sexual 
intercourse itself. 
76 Leader-Elliott, above n 58, 30. 
77 Ibid. 
78 DEAKIN LAW REVIEW VOLUME 15 NO 1 
responsibility sections were either an optional extra or hopelessly 
intermingled with the substantive offence rather than governing the particular 
offence provision. 
Leader-Elliott’s description above of Dixon CJ’s judgment as ‘devastating’ 
appears somewhat dramatic given that section 23 has survived unscathed and, 
some 20 years after Vallance was decided, the Northern Territory opted for a 
variation of the Griffith Code. However, a case can be made that the common 
law jurisdictions were likely to take some comfort that Australia’s greatest 
judge was not enamoured of the Griffith Codes. Furthermore, the limitations 
of section 23(1)(b) of the Criminal Code (Qld) (which states that a person is 
not criminally responsible for an event that occurs by accident)78 in dealing 
with killings that have resulted from so called ‘one-punch’ assaults led the 
Queensland Government to refer the excuse of accident following widespread 
public disquiet to the Queensland Law Reform Commission. Somewhat 
surprisingly, the Commission recently recommended that section 23(1)(b) 
should be retained.79
The Commission was apparently unable to envisage any other alternative than 
the repeal of section 23(1)(b), pointing out that repeal would have far reaching 
consequences because ‘accident’ applies generally to criminal offences and 
not just to manslaughter.
 
80 The Commission concluded that the excuse of 
accident was ‘a critical provision of the Code’ and therefore the ‘Code should 
continue to include an excuse of accident’.81
Leader-Elliott has argued that the counterweight to Dixon CJ’s criticisms can 
be found in the  
 Ironically, the solution to the 
issues that the Queensland Government referred to the Commission on the 
excuse of accident was readily available in the form of Part 2.2 of the 
Criminal Code (Cth) and the definitions of the fault elements for criminal 
responsibility contained therein.  
seminal [judgment] delivered by Brennan J in He Kaw Teh v The Queen82 
[which] looks forward to Chapter 2 of the Model Criminal Code [and] 
provided the template for the provisions which set out the elements of 
criminal liability.83
                                                 
78 The equivalent section in the Criminal Code (WA) is s 23B(2). 
  
79 Queensland Law Reform Commission, A Review of the Excuse of Accident and the Defence 
of Provocation, Report No 64, (2008) 9. 
80 Ibid 184. 
81 Ibid 184–5. 
82 (1985) 157 CLR 523. 
83 Leader-Elliott, above n 58, 29. 
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The learned author goes on to liken Part 2.2 of the Criminal Code (Cth) which 
is based on the Model Criminal Code  
to rules of statutory interpretation [which] possess a quasi-constitutional 
status because they articulate principles of common law which are generally 
taken to embody fundamental principles of criminal justice.84
In a more recent article, Leader-Elliott has stated that ‘[i]t is implicit in the 
Code that the general principles and the definitions of concepts in Chapter 2 
take priority over the localised “context and subject matter” of particular 
offences’
  
85 by virtue of Part 2.2 (‘Application’) which states that Chapter 2 
applies to all offences against this Code. The learned author unfavourably 
compares this with Griffith’s Queensland Criminal Code where he describes 
the general principles as having been vitiated as a result of ‘their 
subordination to the local particularities of the substantive offences’.86
The most important component of Chapter 2 of the Criminal Code (Cth) is 
Part 2.2, which covers the elements of an offence. The formula
 Thus, 
the position put by Leader-Elliott is that Part 2.2 overcomes the problems with 
the Griffith Codes identified by Dixon CJ in Vallance, and by implication is 
both a substantial improvement on the Griffith Codes and meets Bentham’s 
criterion of ‘no blank spaces’. 
87 adopted is 
that an offence consists of physical and fault elements (although an offence 
may provide for no fault element in the case of strict or absolute liability).88
                                                 
84 Ibid 31. 
 
Physical elements can be conduct, a result of conduct or a circumstance in 
which conduct, or a result of conduct, happens. Fault elements can be 
85 Ian Leader-Elliott, ‘The Australian Criminal Code: Time for Some Changes’ (2009) 37(2) 
Federal Law Review 205, 210. 
86 Ibid. 
87 See Regina v J S [2007] NSWCCA 38, (10 September 2004) [145] (Spigelman CJ): 
‘Fundamental aspects of the law have been altered by the Criminal Code in substantial and 
indeed critical matters, by the replacement of a body of nuanced case law, which never 
purported to be comprehensive, with the comparative rigidity of a set of interconnecting 
verbal formulae which do purport to be comprehensive and which involve the application of a 
series of cascading provisions, including definitional provisions, expressed in language 
intended to be capable of only one meaning, which meaning does not necessarily reflect 
ordinary usage.’ 
88 See Regina v J S [2007] NSWCCA 38, (10 September 2004) [152] (Spigelman CJ): ‘No 
provision of the Code states that a physical element which is a question of law for the judge 
cannot have attached to it a fault element which the jury must decide. The Code makes no 
direct distinction between questions of law and questions of fact. It does, however, make 
express provision for decoupling a specific physical element, relevantly a question of law, 
from any fault element. This can be done by either providing that no fault element applies to 
that physical element (under s 3.1(2)) or by specifying that strict or absolute liability applies 
to the offence (under s 6.1 or s 6.2).’ 
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intention, knowledge, recklessness or negligence, all of which are defined. For 
example, the definition of negligence in section 5.5 is based closely on Nydam 
v The Queen.89
In R v Saengsai-Or Bell J explained the operation of Chapter 2 in relation to 
an offence as follows: 
 
An offence consists of physical and fault elements. Liability for the 
commission of an offence is dependent upon proof of each physical element 
of the offence together with proof of the fault element that is applicable to 
each physical element. An offence may comprise more than one physical 
element and different fault elements may apply to each physical element: 
s 3.1 (provision is made for the law creating an offence to specify that there 
is no fault element for one or more of the physical elements of the offence). 
In the absence of specification of the fault element (or specification that 
there is no fault element) for a physical element the Criminal Code makes 
provision for default fault elements: s 5.6.  
Intention is the default fault element for a physical element that consists 
only of conduct: s 5.6(1). Recklessness is the default fault element for a 
physical element that consists of a circumstance or a result: s 5.6(2).90
Essentially, the basic offence structure (physical and fault elements) of the 
Criminal Code (Cth) is that the conduct (act) must be intentional and the 
person engaging in the conduct must be reckless (the threshold for liability) 
either as to the result of the conduct or as to the circumstance in which the 




                                                 
89 [1977] VR 430. 
 which requires an awareness of a substantial risk, 
the taking of which is unjustifiable. The subjective requirement of 
‘awareness’ for recklessness is the sole distinction between recklessness and 
negligence in the Criminal Code (Cth). (The test for the latter is totally 
objective, negligence requiring such a great falling short of the standard of 
care that a reasonable person would exercise, and such a high risk that the 
physical element exists, that the conduct merits criminal punishment.) 
Notwithstanding the fact that Part 2.2 treats the distinction between 
recklessness and negligence as fundamental (only recklessness contains a 
subjective component), it was demonstrated in Simpson v The Queen that 
there is a thin line between recklessness and negligence – between the actual 
(subjective) awareness of a risk and the objective awareness of the risk based 
90 R v Narongchai Saengsai-Or [2004] NSWCCA 108 (19 August 2004) [42]–[43]. 
91 Leader-Elliott, above n 58, 39. 
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on the fact that the risk was obvious.92 It requires but a small step to envisage 
that the ‘fall back’ fault element of recklessness in the Criminal Code (Cth) 
may not be up to the task it has been allocated, as Leader-Elliott has 
acknowledged.93
In R v Saengsai-Or, the appellant appealed against his conviction under 
section 233B(1)(b) Customs Act 1901 (Cth) for importing into Australia a 
trafficable quantity of heroin concealed in two bottles of brandy. Bell J 
considered that the physical element of the offence created by section 
233B(1)(b) was one of conduct: the act of importing into Australia any 
prohibited import to which the section applies. Her Honour found that ‘in 
respect of this physical element, which consists only of conduct, the 
provisions of s 5.6(1) of the Criminal Code apply. Intention is the fault 
element’.
 
94 The jury members at first instance had been directed that if they 
were satisfied of the appellant’s awareness of a substantial risk that the brandy 
bottles contained narcotics and that in the circumstances it was unjustifiable to 
take that risk, then the element of intention would be proved. As the jury had 
thus been directed on recklessness, Bell J held that this was a misdirection.95
More recently, the High Court in The Queen v Tang
  
96
                                                 
92 (1998) 103 A Crim R 19. In Simpson, the High Court was construing s 157(1)(c) of the 
Criminal Code 1924 (Tas) which deals with murder and, in particular, whether the offender 
knew or ought to have known whether the unlawful act was likely to cause death in the 
circumstances. The High Court held that if a fact or circumstance is so well known that no 
reasonable person in the community would dispute it (here stabbing the deceased in the 
general area of the upper body), a jury may safely infer that the offender (appellant) knew it 
unless denial by him raises a reasonable doubt about his knowledge.  
 was required to 
consider an appeal by the Crown against the quashing of convictions under 
section 270.3(1)(a) Criminal Code (Cth), which dealt with possession of a 
slave or the exercise over a slave of any of the other powers attaching to the 
right of ownership. The Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Victoria had 
quashed Ms Tang’s convictions, holding that the jury should have been 
instructed that the prosecution had to prove that Ms Tang had the knowledge 
or belief that the powers being exercised were obtained through ownership, as 
well as proving the intention of Ms Tang to exercise those powers. The 
prosecution had appealed to the High Court. 
93 Leader-Elliott, above n 58, 39–40. Ian Leader-Elliott makes the point that in England, 
following Caldwell v Commissioner of Police ([1982] AC 341), ‘the distinction between 
recklessness and negligence notoriously collapsed’, going on to suggest that the difficulties of 
maintaining the distinction across a range of offences ‘are considerable’ as are ‘the 
temptations to dilute the requirement of actual awareness’. 
94 R v Narongchai Saengsai-Or [2004] NSWCCA 108 (19 August 2004) [72]. 
95 R v Narongchai Saengsai-Or [2004] NSWCCA 108 (19 August 2004) [75]. 
96 [2008] HCA 39 (28 August 2008). 
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The High Court allowed the appeal, holding that the prosecution had made out 
the required elements of the offences and did not need to prove what Ms Tang 
knew or believed about her rights of ownership. The prosecution did not need 
to prove that she knew or believed that the women were slaves. The critical 
powers that she exercised were the power to make each woman an object of 
purchase, the capacity to use the women in a substantially unrestricted manner 
for the duration of their contracts, the power to control and restrict their 
movements, and the power to use their services without commensurate 
compensation.97
Gleeson CJ took issue with the reasoning of the Court of Appeal in the 
following terms: 
 
Chapter 2 of the Code does not provide support for the Court of Appeal’s 
reasoning … [T]he physical element of the offence was conduct, which is 
defined to include both an act and a state of affairs … Both possessing a 
slave and using a slave are conduct, and the prosecution had to establish the 
existence of the conduct and one of the fault elements specified in s 5.1(1). 
The prosecution case was conducted on the basis that the relevant fault 
element was intention … Eames JA said that all of sub-ss (1), (2) and (3) of 
s 5.2 were relevant. This is not easy to understand: sub-s (1) applies where 
the physical element is conduct; sub-s (2) applies where the physical 
element is a circumstance; sub-s (3) applies where the physical element is a 
result. Section 4.1 says a physical element may be conduct or a result of 
conduct or a circumstance in which conduct or a result of conduct occurs.  
The physical element was conduct (which includes a state of affairs); the 
fault element was intention. It was, therefore, s 5.2(1) that was relevant. A 
person has intention with respect to conduct if he or she means to engage in 
that conduct. Knowledge or belief is often relevant to intention. If, for 
example, it is the existence of a state of affairs that gives an act its criminal 
character, then proof of knowledge of that state of affairs ordinarily will be 
the best method of proving that an accused meant to engage in the 
proscribed conduct.98
Two conclusions can be drawn from R v Saengsai-Or and The Queen v Wei 
Tang. The first is that judges have the same difficulties in interpreting Chapter 
2 of the Criminal Code (Cth) as any other code or statute. Secondly, Dixon 
CJ’s dicta in Vallance that specific solutions to code provisions have to be 
worked out judicially are as valid today as when the then Chief Justice wrote 
them in 1961. Leader-Elliott rather optimistically considers that Chapter 2 has 
  
                                                 
97 Public Information Officer, High Court of Australia, ‘The Queen v Wei Tang’ (Media 
Release, 28 August 2008).  
98 The Queen v Tang [2008] HCA 39 (28 August 2008) [46]–[47] (emphasis in original) 
(citations omitted). 
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‘emerged unscathed, indeed reinforced, as a consequence of judicial scrutiny 
by the High Court in R v Tang … remarkable for the strict literalism of its 
interpretation of Part 2.2’.99
In R v J S,
 
100 Spigelman CJ gave an extended analysis of the statutory 
interpretation of Chapter 2 of the Criminal Code (Cth). In that case, the court 
was concerned with the intentional destruction of data that might later be 
required in judicial proceedings, contrary to section 39 of the Crimes Act 1914 
(Cth). Spigelman CJ drew attention to the need for the elements of section 39 
to be interpreted within the context of the relevant Criminal Code (Cth) 
provisions ‘which require a particular analysis, in accordance with the 
requirements of that Code’.101 For example, His Honour pointed out that ‘[b]y 
reason of the express reference to knowledge in s 39 of the Crimes Act 1914 
(Cth), the relevant fault element for present purposes is “knowledge” which is 
defined in s 5.3’ [Criminal Code (Cth)].102
In its submissions to this Court the Appellant sought to draw a distinction 
between different kinds of elements of an offence. It invoked a distinction 
between ‘substantive’ and ‘definitional’ characteristics of a physical 
element of an offence, suggested by the author of a text on the Code.
 In this respect, the Criminal Code 
(Cth) with its specific matching of physical and fault elements seeks to avoid 
the criticisms that Dixon CJ in Vallance levelled at the Griffith Code in 
general and section 13 of the Criminal Code (Tas) in particular. An important 
aspect of the case was that Spigelman CJ rejected the appellant’s submission 
that there were categories of fault elements that arose by implication despite 
being unspecified in the provisions of the Code. 
103 It 
also invoked a similar distinction, drawn by the author of another text, 
between ‘facts’ and ‘statutory references or designations’.104
I do not think it is open, when construing a Code, to decide that there are 
elements of an offence that are merely ‘definitional’ or ‘referential’ in such 
manner as to permit the words used in the formulation of the offence to be 
set aside. The very breadth of the definition of ‘physical element’, 
encompassing as it does anything capable of answering the description of a 
                    
                                                 
99 Leader-Elliott, a above n 85, 205. 
100 Regina v J S [2007] NSWCCA 38 (10 September 2004). 
101 Regina v J S [2007] NSWCCA 38 (10 September 2004) [8]. Spigelman CJ stated that the 
relevant provisions of the Criminal Code (Cth) were s 3.1 (‘Elements’); s 3.2 (‘Establishing 
guilt in respect of offences’); s 4.1 which deals with matters capable of constituting a physical 
element (here, s 4.1(1)(c) – a circumstance in which conduct occurs); and sections 5.1 and 5.3 
which cover the relevant fault element (here, knowledge): [8]–[11]. 
102 Regina v J S [2007] NSWCCA 38 (10 September 2004) [11]. 
103 Odgers, above n 25, 22 [4.1.390]. 
104 Commonwealth Attorney-General’s Department, The Commonwealth Criminal Code: A 
Guide for Practitioners (2002) 119. 
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‘circumstance’, indicates that all of the words of a statutory offence to 
which the Criminal Code applies must be given force and effect.105
Thus, there is support for the claim that judicial interpretation of Part 2.2 
should be conducted with ‘strict literalism’, of which Dixon CJ would 
doubtless have approved. For example, in Campbell v R Spigelman CJ held 
that the new statutory context of a code
  
106 covering a wide range of drug 
offences suggested ‘that a precise, rather than expansive, sense of the word 
“imports”107 has been adopted’.108 However, the more important question is 
whether the approach to Criminal Code (Cth) interpretation ‘on the basis it 
comprehensively states each of the elements of a criminal offence’109 is 
sound. Spigelman CJ states that such an approach follows of necessity 
because ‘[t]hat is the central purpose of adopting a Code’.110
[I]t is apparent on the face of the offence, as interpreted in the light of the 
Criminal Code precisely what are the physical elements of an offence and to 
precisely which of those physical elements a fault element, if any, attaches 
and what that fault element is.
 However, his 
Honour goes on to point out that there is a built-in assumption to this 
approach, namely, that: 
111
This of greater significance, bearing in mind that the principles of criminal 
responsibility in Chapter 2 were born out of a Code seeking to address the 
 
                                                 
105 Regina v J S [2007] NSWCCA 38 (10 September 2004) [126]–[127]. 
106 Spigelman CJ notes that ‘the Commonwealth’s long standing legislative regime with respect 
to imports was engrafted upon the proposed national model for drug offences’: Regina v J S 
[2007] NSWCCA 38 (10 September 2004) [114]. His Honour continues by quoting from the 
Explanatory Memorandum for the Bill which explains that the import and export offences in 
Division 307 are based on the Customs Act 1901 (Cth) whereas the other offences are based 
on Chapter 6 of the Model Criminal Code which was developed in 1998 by the MCCOC. 
[115]. 
107 Section 300.2 of the Criminal Code (Cth) now contains a definition of the word ‘import’ in 
order to overcome the decision in Campbell v R. 
108 [2008] NSWCCA 214 (16 September 2008) [126]. In Campbell the jury was handed a 
document identifying six elements of which they had to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt 
in order to convict the appellant. The most important element was number 5: that Mrs 
Campbell knew that there were tablets with pseudoephedrine in them inside container DLCU 
2141810 or Mrs Campbell was aware of a substantial risk that there were tablets with 
pseudoephedrine in them inside container DLCU 2141810 and, in the circumstances known to 
her, it was unjustifiable for her to take that risk by importing the container. 
109 Regina v J S [2007] NSWCCA 38 (10 September 2004) [129] (Spigelman CJ). 
110 Regina v J S [2007] NSWCCA 38 (10 September 2004) [129] (Spigelman CJ). 
111 Regina v J S [2007] NSWCCA 38 (10 September 2004) [129] (Spigelman CJ). 
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interpretation of offences against the person which, as Leader-Elliott 
acknowledges, ‘are of only marginal importance in federal jurisdiction’.112
In Crowther v Sala,
  
113
The Queensland Court of Appeal divided 2:1 on a further appeal by the 
applicant. Williams JA dissented, finding that the only fault element necessary 
for the offence was the intention to use the telephone and utter the words. He 
considered that, because section 474.17(1)(b) contained the phrase ‘that 
reasonable persons would regard as being in all the circumstances, menacing’, 
the subjective intent of the person uttering the words was not relevant.
 a case where the relevant fault element was disputed, 
the applicant appealed her conviction under section 474.17(1) of the Criminal 
Code (Cth), which deals with using a carriage service (here a telephone line) 
to menace, harass or cause offence. There was no dispute as to the relevant 
content of the applicant’s two telephone calls made 10 minutes apart, which 
was to the effect that unless she got an answer to her question she would get a 
shotgun and was going to use it on everyone in the complainant’s office. The 
Magistrate rejected the applicant’s contention that she was only using 
Australian colloquialisms in finding that, objectively, a reasonable person 
would find her words menacing. On appeal, the District Court judge agreed in 
applying an objective test. 
114 His 
Honour concluded that ‘a fault element has been excluded by necessary 
implication with respect to the element of the offence that reasonable persons 
would in the circumstances regard the conduct in question as menacing’.115
The judgment for the majority was given by Philip McMurdo J who found 
that there was no implied exclusion of the fault element in section 
474.17(1)(b) and that what must be proved is ‘that objectively viewed the 
conduct was menacing and that the defendant either intended that it be so or 
was reckless as to that fact’.
 
116
Interestingly, Leader-Elliott has viewed the decision in Crowther v Sala as 
something of a double-edged sword. On the one hand, the learned author 
 His Honour reached that conclusion by virtue 
of section 5.6(2), which provides that, if the law creating the offence does not 
specify a fault element for a physical element that consists of a circumstance 
or a result, then the corresponding fault element is recklessness. As the 
Magistrate had made no finding as to what the applicant had thought about 
her conduct at the time, the appeal was allowed. 
                                                 
112 Leader-Elliott, above n 58, 31. 
113 [2007] QCA 133 (20 April 2007). 
114 Crowther v Sala [2007] QCA 133 (20 April 2007) [23]–[25]. 
115 Crowther v Sala [2007] QCA 133 (20 April 2007) [27]. 
116 Crowther v Sala [2007] QCA 133 (20 April 2007) [47]. 
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applauded the decision as ‘a salutary instance of strict construction of the 
requirements of Chapter 2’117 whilst also finding that the decision represented 
‘a danger signal, requiring legislative intervention’.118 Leader-Elliott’s 
preferred amendment to the Code would be ‘to the effect that falling short of 
an OP [ordinary person] or RP [reasonable person] standard constitutes a 
Division 5 fault element’.119 This fault element would operate in a similar 
manner to the existing fault element of negligence and thereby avoid the 
automatic application of section 5.6 (‘Offences that do not specify fault 
elements’) ‘when breach of the standard is characterised as a circumstantial 
element of an offence’.120
This is a novel suggestion and entirely consistent with the architecture of 
Chapter 2 with its interconnecting formulae.
 
121 However, as the case law on 
the Criminal Code (Cth) grows, it can be confidently anticipated that judges 
will be increasingly required to decide as to which physical and fault elements 
apply to specified offences under the circumstances of the particular case. 
Such an outcome would be unsurprising given both the formulaic nature of 
Part 2.2 and the breadth of Commonwealth offences.122
One area that may require judicial clarification is that of causation, which is 
an element of an offence against the person. In contrast with the Criminal 
Code (Cth), the Griffith Codes give considerable attention to causation. For 
example, the general causation provision in the Criminal Code (Qld) is 
 So perhaps the 
Criminal Code (Cth) has not so much emerged ‘unscathed’ or ‘reinforced’ as 
it has started to undego a period of judicial clarification natural for a code 
which was first minted in 1995 and which marks a major break with the 
architecture of the Griffith Codes.  
                                                 
117 Leader-Elliott, above n 85, 230. 
118 Ibid. 
119 Ibid 232. 
120 Ibid. 
121 John Gardner has identified a distinction between the definitional general part, which 
Leader-Elliott suggests corresponds to Chapter 2, and the supervisory general part which 
Leader-Elliott suggests corresponds to the Commonwealth Attorney-General’s Department 
Guide to Framing Commonwealth Offences, Civil Penalties and Enforcement Powers (2007). 
See above n 85, 215–6, citing John Gardner, ‘On the General Part of the Criminal Law: 
Principles and Critique’ in R A Duff (ed), Philosophy and the Criminal Law (Cambridge 
University Press, 1998) 208–9. 
122 See, eg, the Crimes Legislation Amendment (Serious and Organised Crime) Act 2010 (Cth) 
which amended the following Commonwealth Acts: Crimes Act 1914, Criminal Code Act 
1995, Customs Act 1901, Family Law Act 1975, Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 and the 
Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979. One of the amendments to the 
Criminal Code Act 1995 was to insert a new s 11.2A (‘Joint Commission’) into Part 2 which 
incorporates the notion of joint criminal enterprise. 
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section 293123 which is then extended by the terms of sections 294 to 298124 
which have the effect of deeming the defendant to have caused death in 
particular circumstances. However, the test for causation is not defined in the 
Griffith Codes, and judges have had recourse to decided cases. The leading 
case is Royall v R125 where the High Court identified four basic tests for 
causation: the operating and substantial cause test; the natural consequences 
test; the reasonable foresight of consequences test; and the novus actus 
interviens test.126
The only Australian Criminal Code to nominate one of these tests of causation 
is the Criminal Code (NT) where in section 149C the operating and 
substantial cause test has been singled out.
  
127 Lamentably, the Criminal Code 
(Cth) has ignored the question of causation altogether. Thus, for sections 
115.1 to 115.4, which respectively cover murder, manslaughter, intentionally 
causing serious harm and recklessly causing serious harm, the courts will have 
to decide which test of causation is applicable in the circumstances of the case 
when it must be decided whether the chain of causation has been broken. 
Kenny has suggested that for the Griffith Codes of Queensland and Western 
Australia the ‘test is whether the accused’s actions were a substantial or 
significant cause of death’,128 arguing that, if the test of foreseeability is 
adopted, ‘there is little or no scope for the operation of the excuse of accident 
[s 23] under the Codes’.129
                                                 
123 Section 293 states: ‘Except as hereinafter set forth, any person who causes the death of 
another, directly or indirectly, by any means whatever, is deemed to have killed that other 
person.’ The equivalent section in the Criminal Code (WA) is s 270. 
 However, the respective State legislatures remain 
silent on this matter, presumably preferring the flexibility of the common law. 
124 The equivalent sections in the Criminal Code (WA) are ss 271–5. 
125 (1991) 172 CLR 378. 
126 Royall v R (1990) 172 CLR 378, 449 (Brennan J). 
127 Section 149C (‘Causing death or harm’) states: ‘For an offence under this Part [Part VI 
(‘Offences against the person and other matters’)], a person’s conduct causes death or harm if 
it substantially contributes to the death or harm.’ The implication from this single sentence is 
that the court is to apply Hallett v R [1969] SASR 141 which was approved by the two judges 
in Royall (Toohey and Gaudron JJ) who endorsed the operating and substantial cause test. 
128 R G Kenny, An Introduction to Criminal Law in Queensland and Western Australia 
(LexisNexis Butterworths, 7th ed, 2008) 239 [12.19]. 
129 Ibid. Under s 23 an accused is not criminally responsible for an event which is unforeseen 
by him and not reasonably foreseeable. Kenny cites R v Jemielita (1996) 81 A Crim R 409 
where the appellant appealed his murder conviction on the grounds that the evidence did not 
allow the sequence of the injection and ingestion of drugs to be established beyond reasonable 
doubt, and therefore the deceased’s own conduct may have constituted an intervening act. 
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The author has contended elsewhere130
Section 149C. Causing death or harm 
 that even the specific nomination of 
one of the general tests of causation identified in Royall is not sufficient if the 
more detailed common law tests are to be encoded or excluded. The author set 
down the following extended version of section 149C as a template for a code 
seeking to cover the field and to leave ‘no blank spaces’. It is designed to fully 
reflect the common law under the rubric or heading of the ‘substantially 
contributes’ test of causation and to utilise the deeming provisions of the 
Griffith Codes.  
(1) For an offence under this Part, a person’s conduct causes death or harm 
if it substantially contributes to the death or harm. 
(2) For the purpose of this section, conduct includes direct or indirect 
means, threats, intimidation or deceit.  
(3) For the purpose of this section, substantially means more than trivial or 
minimal but need not be the sole cause or even the main cause of the 
victim’s death. 
(4) For the purpose of this section, a novus actus interveniens must be 
voluntary in the sense that the intervening act is free, deliberate and 
informed, and later conduct can only constitute a novus actus interveniens if 
it was not itself caused by the earlier conduct. The test to be applied is that 
the later conduct must be so independent of the accused’s acts, and in itself 
so potent in causing death, that the contribution made by the accused is 
reduced to insignificance. 
(5) For the purpose of this section, any person who causes to another person 
any harm from which death results, kills that person, although the 
immediate cause of death be treatment proper or improper, applied in good 
faith.131
Notwithstanding the lack of attention to causation in the Criminal Code (Cth), 
arguably, Bentham’s test of ‘no blank spaces’ in a Criminal Code may be met 
for the elements of an offence in Part 2.2, but can the same be said for 
defences and excuses? It is therefore now appropriate to turn to Part 2.3 which 
covers circumstances in which there is no criminal responsibility. 
 
                                                 
130 Andrew Hemming, ‘In Search of a Model Code Provision for Murder in Australia’ (2010) 
34(2) Criminal Law Journal 81, 85–7. 
131 Ibid 87. 
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III CIRCUMSTANCES IN WHICH THERE IS NO CRIMINAL  
       RESPONSIBILITY  
For a defendant to be found guilty of an offence, not only must fault be 
proved against the defendant but it must also be proved that no defences or 
excuses prima facie open on the evidence are available (for example, through 
the prosecution negativing self defence beyond reasonable doubt). In other 
words, the availability of defences must be disproved. Such a binary structure 
of criminal responsibility, which is the combination of proven fault liability 
with the elimination of any defence or excuse, ‘is common to all modern 
codes derived from the common law’.132
In the terminology of the Criminal Code (Cth), the offences are to be found in 
Part 2.2 and the defences in Part 2.3, which is entitled ‘Circumstances in 
which there is no criminal responsibility’ and sets out the defences that are 
generally available. Part 2.3 covers the field of available defences, some of 
which, such as self-defence (section 10.4), do not follow the common law. 
With the usual exception of mental impairment (section 7.3(3)), section 
13.3(3) provides that ‘a defendant who wishes to rely on any exception, 
exemption, excuse, qualification or justification provided by the law creating 
the offence bears the evidential burden [of establishing a ‘reasonable 
possibility’] in relation to that matter’. 
 For example, Part II of the Criminal 
Code (NT) is entitled ‘Criminal Responsibility’ and is divided into four 
Divisions: ‘General Matters’, ‘Authorisation’, ‘Justification’ and ‘Excuse’. 
The available defences listed in Part 2.3 are: lack of capacity for criminal 
responsibility; mental impairment; intoxication; mistake or ignorance; 
intervening conduct or event; duress; sudden or extraordinary emergency; and 
self-defence. Significantly, while section 115.1(d) of the Criminal Code (Cth) 
covers murder of an Australian citizen or a resident of Australia outside 
Australia, following the recommendations of the MCCOC in the context of 
developing a uniform criminal code for Australian jurisdictions, there is no 
provision in Part 2.3 for either of the partial defences to murder, namely 
provocation and diminished responsibility. These two partial defences do exist 
in both the Criminal Code (Qld) and the Criminal Code (NT), and will be 
addressed in a later part of this section.  
Of the available defences in Part 2.3, Division 9 covers ‘Circumstances 
involving mistake or ignorance’, and 9.5 deals with ‘Claim of Right’. The 
MCCOC stated that ‘“Claim of right” normally negatives a fault element, 
usually, but not necessarily, one of dishonesty, and the Code should reflect 
                                                 
132 Leader-Elliott, above n 58, 32. 
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that state of the law’.133 Section 9.5 has been singled out elsewhere by the 
present author as an example of inadequate drafting134
Section 9.5 Criminal Code (Cth) currently reads as follows: 
 and will be used here 
to support the contention that brief sections that hide or imply a considerable 
body of case law are unsatisfactory and fail Bentham’s ‘no blank spaces’ test.  
Claim of right  
(1) A person is not criminally responsible for an offence that has a physical 
element relating to property if –  
     (a) at the time of the conduct constituting the offence, the person is under 
a mistaken belief about a proprietary or possessory right ; and  
     (b) the existence of that right would negate a fault element for any 
physical element of the offence. 
(2) A person is not criminally responsible for any other offence arising 
necessarily out of the exercise of the proprietary or possessory right that the 
person mistakenly believes to exist.  
(3) This section does not negate criminal responsibility for an offence 
relating to the use of force against a person. 
The word ‘property’ is not defined in the existing section 9.5. The present 
author has argued135 that the meaning of ‘property’ should be defined to 
narrow the scope of the defence and to explicitly amend existing common law 
authority136
For the purposes of the definition of property in this section, property means 
a person’s honest claim to some right in the property the subject of the 
charge that is personal to him or her. The honest claim of right must extend 
to the whole of the property taken, and does not include property taken in 
compensation as opposed to a right in relation to identified property. 
 as might be done through the proposed subsection below. 
                                                 
133 Criminal Law Officers Committee of the Standing Committee of Attorney’s General, 
Commonwealth Parliament, Model Criminal Code Chapter 2 – General Principles of 
Criminal Responsibility (1992) 61. 
134 See Andrew Hemming, ‘The Time Has Come to Tighten the Reach of Honest Claim of 
Right in Australian Criminal Codes’ (2008–9) 11 Newcastle Law Review 167. 
135 Ibid 205. 
136 Walden v Hensler (1987) 163 CLR 561. In the absence of any definition of property in  s 
9.5, the broad definition of property taken by the majority of the High Court in Walden v 
Hensler would perforce be ‘imported’ into s 9.5 rather than the proposed definition of 
property which reflects Pearce v Paskov (1968) WAR 66. 
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Another of the present author’s proposed amendments to section 9.5 reflects 
the powerful dissent of Wells J in R v Lopatta,137
The honest claim of right must be of a kind that is, given favourable 
circumstances, recognised by Australia’s system of law and an honest claim 
which in no circumstances would be recognised by Australia’s system of 
law is excluded from this section.
 who was concerned at the 
reach of ‘honest claim of right’ at common law. 
138
The thrust of the present author’s earlier article was that the excuse of honest 
claim of right, which is limited to property, finds expression in all the 
Criminal Codes in Australia,
 
139 and that, because all of the relevant sections 
are comparatively short,140 they rely on the common law to interpret the reach 
of the excuse, for example through applying the principles that the mistaken 
belief does not have to be reasonable provided that it is genuinely held;141 that 
the fact that the claim is wrongheaded does not matter;142 and that the claim 
may be unfounded in law or in fact.143 In R v Fuge144
A further example from the list of defences in Part 2.3 of the Criminal Code 
(Cth), namely section 10.2 (‘Duress’),
 Wood CJ at CL 
identified a total of nine common law principles relating to an honest claim of 
right, all of which are implicitly imported into section 9.5 of the Criminal 
Code (Cth), but of which the lay reader is totally unaware. In this paper, the 
argument of? honest claim of right is extended to cover a variety of 
circumstances where, like an inexorable tide, the common law seeps into all 
corners of the Codes in Australia. 
145
                                                 
137 (1983) 35 SASR 101, 103. 
 will be annotated in the square 
brackets and footnotes below to illustrate the cases and interpretations that sit 
behind the section like invisible ink. There are strong similarities between the 
defence of duress and the defence of sudden or extraordinary emergency 
(necessity) in section 10.3. For example, both defences require that the person 
138 Hemming, above n 134, 205. 
139 Criminal Code 1995 (Cth) s 9.5; Criminal Code 1983 (NT) s 30(2) and s 43AZ; Criminal 
Code 2002 (ACT) s 38; Criminal Code 1899 (Qld) s 22; Criminal Code 1902 (WA) s 22; and 
Criminal Code 1924 (Tas) ss 42, 44, 45, 226(1) and 267(3). ‘ 
140 For example, s 22(2) of the Criminal Code (Queensland) and the Criminal Code (WA) both 
simply state: ‘But a person is not criminally responsible, as for an offence relating to property, 
for an act done or omitted to be done by the person with respect to any property in the 
exercise of an honest claim of right and without intention to defraud.’ 
141 R v Pollard [1962] QWN 13. 
142 R v Gilson and Cohen [1944] 29 Cr App R 174. 
143 R v Bernhard [1938] 2 KB 264. 
144 R v Fuge [2001] NSWCCA 208 (4 June 2001) [24]. 
145 To be found in Division 10 (‘Circumstances involving external factors’). 
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‘reasonably believes’ that his or her actions were a reasonable response in the 
circumstances. 
Section 10.2 Duress 
(1) A person is not responsible for an offence [all Commonwealth offences 
including murder] if he or she carries out the conduct constituting the 
offence under duress. 
(2) A person carries out conduct under duress if and only if he or she 
reasonably believes [this is not the reasonable person or ordinary person test 
but rather what the defendant might reasonably believe in all the 
circumstances]146
a threat [no limitation on the kind of threat that triggers the defence]
 that: 
147 has 
been made that will be carried out148
there is no reasonable way that the threat can be rendered ineffective 
[objective test of necessity];
 unless an offence is committed; and 
149




                                                 
146 Odgers, above n 25, 103 [10.2.150] citing Oblach v The Queen (2005) 65 NSWLR 75 [56]-
[57] (Spigelman CJ) where the authority of Mason J in Viro v The Queen (1978) 141 CLR 88 
was considered to be ‘helpful’. 
 
147 The implication from the lack of qualification of ‘a threat’ is that the threatener need not be 
physically present when the offence is carried out (R v Hurley and Murray [1967] VR 526), 
that the threat need not be carried out immediately but could be carried out after a short 
interval (R v Hudson and Taylor [1971] 2 QB 202), that the threat must not be too remote 
from the criminal conduct (R v Hudson and Taylor [1971] 2 QB 202) and that the threat need 
not be directed at the accused but can be indirect – for example it can be aimed at a third 
person (R v Hurley and Murray [1967] VR 526). 
148 Bronitt and McSherry, above n 6, 322, suggest that ‘it would seem that an honest and 
reasonable, but mistaken belief may form the basis for a defence of duress’, citing R v 
Graham [1982] 1 WLR 294, 300 (Lord Lane CJ). 
149 ‘In all jurisdictions, there is a legal duty on the accused to escape from the person making 
threats should a reasonable opportunity to do so present itself’: Bronitt and McSherry, above n 
6, citing, inter alia, R v Abusafiah (1991) 24 NSWLR 531. 
150 In Oblach v The Queen (2005) 65 NSWLR 75 [55] Spigelman CJ said the following of the 
defence of duress in s 10.2 of the Criminal Code (Cth): ‘Paragraphs 10.2(2)(b) and (c) each 
adopt the word “reasonable” to apply an objective test to the elements of necessity and 
proportionality of response.’ Odgers, above n 25, 104 [10.2.210], has suggested that ‘since 
this provision reflects the common law, it is likely that it will be “construed against the strong 
policy considerations in this area of the law”: Morris v The Queen [2006] WASCA 142 [154] 
(McClure J)’. Such policy considerations reflect the presumption that under ordinary 
circumstances criminal intimidation is reported to the police (R v Brown (1986) 43 SASR 33, 
40 (King CJ)). 
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The same approach can be taken to any one of the defences in Part 2.3 of the 
Criminal Code (Cth) to reinforce the theme of this paper that a copious body 
of case law sits behind such short sections in Codes. Indeed, the interpretation 
of a section may be further muddied if a well known common law test has 
been slightly altered, as in section 10.4(2), which deals with the subjective 
(conduct is necessary) and objective (reasonable response) tests for self-
defence. Section 10.4(2) dilutes the objective test by the use of the words ‘the 
conduct is a reasonable response in the circumstances as he or she 
[‘reasonably’ has been omitted] perceives them’.151
This Act does not affect the operation of the general law in relation to the 
tort of defamation except to the extent that this Act provides otherwise 
(whether expressly or by necessary implication). 
 It might be better and 
more accurate to include a statement in a Criminal Code that expressly 
recognises the importation of the common law, such as the one to be found in 
section 5(2) of the Defamation Act 2006 (NT): 
This paper takes issue with Leader-Elliott’s response to his own question of 
what happened to the common law of criminal responsibility in Chapter 2 
Criminal Code (Cth). The learned author replied that 
traces remain, secreted in the statutory interstices of Chapter 2 … [T]here 
will be occasions when judicial recourse to common law principles will be 
unavoidable for want of guidance in the Code.152
However, with respect, in point of fact the writing
  
153
A rather poignant example of the statute law of another jurisdiction (rather 
than the common law) seeping in and filling up the gaps can be seen in the 
interpretation of section 8 of the Criminal Codes for Queensland and Western 
Australia, which deals with offences committed in prosecution of a common 
 of the common law is 
plainly showing on the palimpsest on which Chapter 2 of the Criminal Code 
(Cth) is superimposed. Chapter 2 resembles a cipher that requires a common 
law decoding book to make sense of its provisions.  
                                                 
151 (emphasis added). Compare s 29(2)(b) Criminal Code (NT) which follows the common law 
objective test of a reasonable response as the person reasonably perceives the circumstances 
with the Model Criminal Code importation in s 43BD(2)(b) Criminal Code (NT) which 
allows the perception to be subjective by omitting ‘reasonably’. 
152 Leader-Elliott, above n 85, 215. 
153 A palimpsest is a parchment manuscript page from a scroll or book that has been scraped off 
and used again. Windeyer J in Vallance v The Queen (1961) 108 CLR 56, 76, famously 
commented that ‘we cannot interpret its general provisions [Criminal Code (Tas)] concerning 
such basic principles [of criminal responsibility] as if they were written on a tabula rasa. 
Rather is ch.iv of the Code written on a palimpsest, with all the old writing still discernible 
behind’. 
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purpose. Queensland has no sub-section on withdrawal from the common 
purpose. In this respect it is unlike Western Australia, where withdrawal is 
covered in section 8(2) and allows the person to avoid criminal responsibility 
if, after having withdrawn, he or she ‘took all reasonable steps to prevent the 
commission of the offence’.154 The response of the Queensland judiciary has 
been to ‘import’ the reasonable steps test from Western Australia into section 
8 of the Criminal Code (Qld), which is silent on withdrawal, rather than the 
more stringent common law test of the defendant needing to eliminate his or 
her conduct as a cause of the ultimate offence.155
Earlier in this section of the paper mention was made of the partial defences to 
murder of diminished responsibility and provocation, neither of which is 
available under the Criminal Code (Cth) but both of which are available under 
the Criminal Code (Qld)
 
156 and the Criminal Code (NT).157
When a person who unlawfully kills another under circumstances which, 
but for the provision of this section, would constitute murder, does the act 
which causes death in the heat of passion caused by sudden provocation, 
and before there is time for his passion to cool, he is guilty of manslaughter 
only. 
 To illustrate the 
theme of this paper – that the common law infuses short sections in Codes – 
section 304 of the Criminal Code (Qld) will be contrasted with a proposed 
amended section 158 of the Criminal Code (NT). While the former deals with 
provocation and cannot be properly read without knowledge of the common 
law, the latterspells out the meaning of the section and the tests to be applied 
in some detail. Section 304 reads: 
Kenny points out that in Queensland ‘in the absence of a statutory definition 
of provocation for murder, reliance is placed upon the principles pertaining to 
provocation as they develop at common law’.158 The section hides both a 
subjective and objective test. The ‘heat of passion’ requirement introduces a 
subjective test whereby all the surrounding circumstances may be taken into 
account such as the personal characteristics of the defendant.159
                                                 
154 See s 8(2)(c) Criminal Code (WA). 
 But this test 
based on loss of self-control is constrained by an objective requirement that 
155 See, eg, White v Ridley (1978) 140 CLR 342, 350 (Gibbs J) and R v Menitti [1985] 1 Qd R 
520, 528 (Thomas J). 
156 See s 304A for diminished responsibility and s 304 for provocation.  
157 See s 159 for diminished responsibility and s 158 for provocation. Both defences are also 
available in New South Wales (s 23 and s 23A Crimes Act 1900) and the Australian Capital 
Territory (s 13 and s 14 Crimes Act 1900). 
158 Kenny, above n 128, 250 [12.52] citing High Court authority in Kaporonovski v The Queen 
(1973) 133 CLR 209. 
159 Parker v The Queen (1964) 111 CLR 610, 628. 
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the provocation must have been sufficient to be likely to deprive the ordinary 
person of the power of self-control and induce the act that caused the death.160
By contrast, and in keeping with Bentham’s call for ‘no blank spaces’ in a 
criminal code, the present author has rewritten section 158 of the Criminal 
Code (NT) below to clarify how the partial defence to murder of provocation 
is designed to operate. 
 
This is a classic example of the common law devising a two-step test invisible 
to the ordinary lay reader of the Code. 
158 Trial for murder – partial defence of provocation  
(1) A person (the defendant) who would, apart from this section, be guilty 
of murder must not be convicted of murder if the defence of provocation 
applies.  
(2) The defence of provocation applies if the conduct of the deceased was 
such as could have induced an ordinary person to have so far lost self-
control as to have formed an intent to kill or cause serious harm to the 
deceased. 
(3) Loss of self-control is defined as meaning a sudden and temporary loss 
of self-control, rendering the defendant so subject to passion as to make him 
or her for the moment not master of his or her mind.161 The loss of self-
control due to resentment, grievance or revenge is specifically excluded.162
(4) The defendant must not have incited the provocation.
 
163
(5) Grossly insulting words or gestures towards or affecting the defendant 
are excluded from conduct of a kind that induces the defendant's loss of 
self-control.  
 
(6) A defence of provocation may only arise if the conduct of the deceased 
occurred immediately before the conduct causing death and not at an earlier 
time.164
                                                 
160 Stingel v The Queen (1990) 171 CLR 312, 325. 
   
161 Taken from Devlin J’s classic definition in R v Duffy [1949] 1 All ER 932. See also Tindal 
CJ in R v Hayward (1833) 6 C & P 157, 159 who described the provocation defence as 
applying to an accused who acted ‘while smarting under a provocation so recent and so strong 
that the prisoner might not be considered at the moment the master of his own understanding’. 
162 Van den Hoek v The Queen (1986) 161 CLR 158. 
163 This has the effect of reintroducing the now repealed s 34(2)(a) of the Criminal Code (NT). 
164 This subsection specifically ousts authority to the effect that the provocation should be 
considered in the light of the whole history of the relationship. See, eg, Moffa v The Queen 
(1977) 138 CLR 601. 
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(7) Conduct of the deceased consisting of a non-violent sexual advance or 
advances towards the defendant is not a sufficient basis for a defence of 
provocation.  
(8) Conduct of the deceased consisting of the deceased’s choice about a 
relationship with the defendant is not a sufficient basis for a defence of 
provocation.165
(9) For deciding whether the conduct causing death occurred under 
provocation, there is a rule of law that provocation is negatived if:  
 
(a) there was no reasonable proportionality between the conduct causing 
death and the conduct of the deceased that induced the conduct causing 
death; or  
(b) the conduct causing death did not occur suddenly.  
(10) The burden of establishing a defence of provocation is a legal burden 
and lies on the defence.166
(11) A defendant who would, apart from this section, be liable to be 
convicted of murder must be convicted of manslaughter instead.  
 
The above proposed section explicitly defines the nature of the partial 
defence. The policy decisions that narrow the defence to only the most serious 
of provocations, in relation to which the defendant bears the legal onus of 
proof on the balance of probabilities, are clearly stated. No recourse to second 
reading speeches is necessary.  
In summary, when one casts an eye over this potpourri of defences, from 
claim of right and duress in the Criminal Code (Cth) to provocation in the 
Criminal Codes of Queensland and the Northern Territory, one sees that the 
golden thread of the common law runs through and links all these defences. 
Unlike Part 2.2 of the Criminal Code (Cth), which is a comprehensive 
statement of the elements of an offence, Part 2.3 (‘Circumstances in which 
there is no criminal responsibility’) draws far more heavily on the common 
law, both explicitly and implicitly. 
                                                 
165 The ordinary person does not respond to a relationship breakdown by killing his or her 
partner. ‘Men who kill when affronted by their intimate partners are truly extraordinary’: G 
Coss, ‘The Defence of Provocation: An Acrimonious Divorce from Reality’ (2006) 18(1) 
Current Issues in Criminal Justice 51, 53. 
166 Above n 79, 11. The Queensland Law Reform Commission recommended that s 304 of the 
Criminal Code (Qld) should be amended by adding a provision to the effect that the defendant 
bears the onus of proof of the partial defence of provocation on the balance of probabilities. 
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IV CONCLUSION  
This paper has contended that criminal codes in Australia are misnamed 
because they fail the fundamental test for a code of comprehensively stating 
the criminal law in one statute. In particular, they fail Bentham’s test requiring 
‘no blank spaces’ in a criminal code. In fairness, it has to be said that the 
Criminal Code (Cth), based as it is on the Model Criminal Code, achieves far 
greater success against this measure than any of the criminal codes in 
Australia that fall under the rubric of the Griffith Codes.  
The Griffith Codes suffer the fatal flaw recognised by Dixon CJ in Vallance, 
namely that the central criminal responsibility section often has little or 
nothing to say about the elements of offences. This was problematic because 
the central provision of the Tasmanian Code (section 13) came ‘ab extra’, 
restraining the operation of what followed even though common sense 
dictated resolution outside of section 13 itself. 
Whilst Part 2.2 of the Criminal Code (Cth) is a comprehensive statement of 
the elements of an offence, it has been suggested that even here two 
conclusions can be drawn from recent cases interpreting Chapter 2, such as R 
v Saengsai-Or and The Queen v Wei Tang. The first is that judges have the 
same difficulties in interpreting Chapter 2 of the Criminal Code (Cth) as they 
have in interpreting any other Code or statute. Secondly, Dixon CJ’s dicta in 
Vallance, that specific solutions to code provisions have be worked out 
judicially, are as valid today as when the Chief Justice wrote them in 1961. 
This argument gathers strength when the focus turns to Part 2.3 
(‘Circumstances in which there is no criminal responsibility’), where the 
imprint of the common law is still discernible behind the Code sections – like 
the old writing on a palimpsest, to paraphrase Windeyer J in another evocative 
image from Vallance. Perhaps, in truth, Bentham’s requirement of ‘no blank 
spaces’ in a Criminal Code is unattainable. In this case it would be more 
appropriate and fitting to explicitly recognise the operation of the common 
law except to the extent that the Code provides otherwise, rather than to 
trumpet (see 2.1 ‘Purpose’) the assertion that Chapter 2 contains all the 
general principles of criminal responsibility that apply to any offence. This 
paper has provided a suggested template as to how defences in Part 2.3 could 
be more explicitly expressed. Such a template would either give greater 
credibility to section 2.1 (‘Purpose’) or underpin the recognition of the 
common law unless specifically excluded in the Code. The law has always 
been more concerned with substance than form, and a code does not 
necessarily qualify as a code simply by calling a body of statute law a code. 
